be provide for a more liberal and pluralistic order but also one that is less coherent and democratic than Egyptians currently realize.
STRIVING FOR JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE
The regime that Egyptians are now attempting to dismantle was built in the years after 1952 in a thoroughly authoritarian manner that placed all levers of control in a series of presidents who ruled Egypt for just short of six decades.
For some time after the 1952 coup that brought that system into being, however, the bulk of the judicial apparatus was left alone. When Egypt's authoritarian rulers wanted a verdict, they constructed special tribunals or moved outside the judicial structure altogether rather than subordinating the regular judiciary to their political will. Only in the late 1960s, in the last years of Gamal Abdel Nasser's presidency, did the regime mount a concerted efffort to fold the judiciary under fĳirm presidential control: a new "Supreme Court" was created by decree stafffed by presidential appointments, a "Supreme Council of Judicial Organizations" was given authority over administrative matters as well as appointment and promotion (and efffectively placed under executive oversight), and a group of over 100 judges who had used the Judges Club (until then largely a social organization) to support calls for political reform were dismissed. Yet over the next decade and a half, Nasser's two successors, Anwar Sadat and Husni Mubarak, rolled back many of Nasser's moves.
The regime retained, to be sure, the old ways of moving outside of the judiciary with a series of special courts and extrajudicial procedures. But they allowed much of the court system to regain its autonomy. The Supreme Court evolved into a more independent Supreme Constitutional Court that actually issued a long series of rulings quite politically inconvenient for the regime from the mid-1980s until the early 2000s. The Supreme Council of Judicial Organizations was deprived of most of its jurisdiction and leading judicial bodies (the administrative court systems, for instance, as well as the regular court system) were given considerable autonomy in their own afffairs. Most of the dismissed judges were rehired. And the judiciary was given some ancillary responsibilities (such as supervision of balloting in the country's 1971 constitution).
But some judges, activists, and intellectuals chafed at the remaining elements of executive influence over judicial afffairs. In a variety of structural ways, the Ministry of Justice and the presidency retained some influence-the Ministry, for instance, in some administrative matters, and the presidency through some appointment powers (the chief justice of the Supreme Constitutional Court, for instance, was a presidential appointment; when the Court became overly independent, President Mubarak abandoned his practice of turning to the most senior justice and instead brought in presidents from outside the Court who helped tame the body).1
